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I. INTRODUCTION

For more than twenty years, the willful patent infringement doctrine has
plagued those involved in patent law.' In the recent decision of In re Seagate
Technology,2 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit") changed the law of willful patent infringement 3 by abolishing the
longstanding rule of the "affirmative duty of care" and the "affirmative obligation to obtain opinion of counsel." 4 This decision overruled the previous standard set forth in UnderwaterDevices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.,5 which was
The Federal Circuit has made many attempts over the years to modify the willful infringement standard and its effects on the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine to overcome the problems associated with this affirmative duty of care. See infra Part lI.B.
2
497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
3
See infra Part III. See also Donald S. Chisum, Donald S. Chisum on Willful Infringement,
Objective Recklessness and the Trial Attorney-Client Privilege, LEXiSNEXIs EXPERT
COMMENTARtES, Sept. 27, 2007, available at LEXIS (search "All Expert Commentaries" database
by author).
4
In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
5
717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The standard set forth in Underwater Devices came one
year after the creation of the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit in Underwater Devices announced that a potential infringer has "an affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine
whether or not he is infringing... [which] includes, inter alia, the duty to seek and obtain competent legal advice from counsel before the initiation of any possible infringing activity." Id. at
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a low threshold standard for willful negligence, and set forth a new standard
requiring at least a showing of objective recklessness. 6 The decision in In re
Seagate did not come lightly as there have been several attempts to change the
"affirmative duty of care" standard to combat the many problems associated
with this standard. 7 The Federal Circuit intended to eliminate the problems associated with the application of the standard for willful patent infringement;
however, the Federal Circuit has tipped the balance in favor of the defendants in
willful patent infringement claims. 8 Although the scales have tipped in favor of
the defendants, the benefits of this new standard outweigh any potential adverse
effects on the patent system and those involved in patent litigation.
The decision by the Federal Circuit in In re Seagate9 set forth the objective recklessness standard for willful patent infringement, but the Court has left
it up to future cases to develop the application of this new standard.1 ° This Note
will focus on predicting the future development of the objective recklessness
standard, the effects on the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine,
and the likely effects on those involved in patent law. Part II of this Note will
discuss the pre-In re Seagate standard of willful patent infringement and the
problems associated with this standard on the patent system, the attorney-client
privilege, and the work product doctrine. Part 1H of this Note will discuss the
decision set forth in In re Seagate" and analyze the questions that the Federal
Circuit attempted to answer in its decision. Part IV of this Note turns to the
future of willful patent infringement and how this new standard of objective
recklessness will affect the patent system and the litigants involved in patent
law. More specifically, this section will attempt to predict the future development of the objective recklessness standard and its effects on the patent system
by applying reasoning which the Federal Circuit used in its decision in In re
Seagate, analyzing civil and copyright case law-which allows for punitive or
treble damages-and analyzing post-In re Seagate decisions that discuss the
new objective recklessness standard. Predicting the future development of the
objective recklessness standard is necessary to fully understand its implications
and effects on future litigants in willful patent infringement claims.

1389-90 (italics part of original); see Milgo Elec. Corp. v. United Bus. Commc'ns, Inc., 623 F.2d
645, 666 (10th Cir. 1980); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Sciaky Bros., Inc., 415 F.2d 1068, 1073-74 (6th Cir.
1969). Although the application of this standard has changed throughout the years, the affirmative
duty of care remained intact until the decision in In re Seagate.
6
In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
7
8

See supra note 1.
See infra Part 1V.C. 1.

9

497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1o Id. at 1371. Although the Federal Circuit defined the new standard as requiring at least a
showing of objective recklessness, the Court noted that the application of this standard will be
developed in future cases.
1

Id.
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II. THE HISTORY OF WILLFUL PATENT INFRINGEMENT AS IT EXISTED PRIOR TO
INRE SEAGATE

The Standardfor Willful Patent Infringement Priorto In Re Seagate

A.

The Supreme Court has observed that "willful" is a term of art that, although widely used in the law, has not been given a precise definition. 12 Furthermore, the Federal Circuit has not expressly defined the term with respect to
patent infringement, nor is the term defined in any statutory authority.' 3 Instead,
the Federal Circuit derived its definition of willfulness in patent infringement by
"analogizing that the common law principle disfavoring an intentional disregard
of legal rights should apply not only to civil laws, but patent laws as well. ' 4
However, lower courts generally understood the term "willful" to refer to conduct that is not merely negligent but voluntary and intentional. 5 A patent right
is regarded as personal property,16 and as such, the patent holder has the right to
exclude others from using the patented product.17 Therefore, when an individual or other entity uses a patented product without the authorization of the patent
holder, the user is infringing on the patent holder's right to the exclusive use of
his or her patent. 8 The willful patent infringement doctrine makes intentional
or voluntary infringement
less attractive because it allows the holder to seek
treble damages.' 9 The purpose of treble damages is to give courts the authority

12

See McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133 (1988).

13 Eric C. Wrzesinski, Breaking the Law to Break into the Black: Patent Infringement as a
Business Strategy, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 193, 197 (2007).
14

Id.

15
16
17

McLaughlin, 486 U.S. at 133; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1630 (8th ed. 2004).
Avery v. Wilson, 20 F. 856, 857 (C.C.W.D.N.C. 1884).
E.g., King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 948 (Fed. Cir. 1995). A more expan-

sive list of a patent holder's rights include:
the right to obtain a reasonable royalty from any person who...
(A)(i) makes, uses, offers for sale, or sells in the United States the invention as
claimed in the published patent application or imports such an invention into
the United States; or
(ii) if the invention as claimed in the published patent application is a process,
uses, offers for sale, or sells in the United States or imports into the United
States products made by that process as claimed in the published patent application.
35 U.S.C. § 154(d)(1) (2006).
18 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(a) (2006).
19
See Smith Corona Corp. v. Pelikan, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 452, 478-79 (M.D. Tenn. 1992) (the
court held that upon a finding of willful infringement, the court may increase the damages up to
three times the amount found); see also Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d
1354, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (the court calculated the damages to be $429,256 and upon a finding
of willful infringement, the court trebled the award and increased the damages to $1,287,766).
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to award the patent holder up to three times the total amount of damages.2 °
Treble damages are applied when the infringer knew his or her actions were in
fact infringing on the patent but continued to do so in the face of the harm such
activity would likely cause the patent holder.2'
Under the standard set forth in Underwater Devices,22 the alleged infringer had an affirmative duty to exercise due care and to seek and obtain competent legal advice from counsel when there was a reason to believe that his or
her activity may be infringing on a patent holder's rights.23 Under this standard,
the patent holder must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the
infringer acted in disregard of his or her patent. 24 Although there was no requirement that the alleged infringer obtain an opinion of counsel to determine if
his or her actions were infringing, 25 without such evidence the trier of fact could
infer that the alleged infringer did not obtain an opinion of counsel or that the
counsel's opinion advised the alleged infringer that his or her activities would in
fact infringe the patent. 26 This adverse inference meant, in practical terms, that
a court "placed the burden on the defendant to ensure that [he or she] was not
infringing, '' 27 and that the best evidence to demonstrate that the defendant met
this burden in good faith was to seek an opinion of counsel.28 In order to help a
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). This section provides as follows regarding exemplary damages:
"When the damages are not found by a jury, the court shall assess them. In either event the court
may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed." Id. For a more com20

plete understanding of enhanced damages see JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III, DONALD C. REILEY III,
& ROBERT C. HIGHLEY, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALs § 20:64 (2d ed. 2007).
21
MILLS ET AL., supra note 20.

22
23
24

717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
Electro Med. Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Scis., Inc. 34 F.3d 1048, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see
Am. Med. Sys. Inc. v. Med. Eng'g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
25
See Rolls-Royce Ltd. v. GTE Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d 1101, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
26
See Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible, Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1579-80 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
27
William F. Lee et al., The Doctrine of Willful Patent Infringement After Knorr-Bremse:
PracticalProblems & Recommendations, 7 SEDONA CONF. J. 169, 170 (2006); see David R.
Clonts, The FederalCircuit Puts the Willfulness Back into Willful Infringement, 19 INTELL. PROP.
& TECH. L.J. 9, 9 (2007) ("A jury, having found a defendant liable for infringing a patent, often
had little trouble overcoming the patentee's clear-and-convincing burden, instead focusing on
whether the defendant had satisfied its affirmative duty to make sure that it was not infringing.").
This in effect placed the burden solely on the defendant to demonstrate that he acted in good faith
and opinion of counsel.
28
Lee, supra note 27, at 189; see Robert P. Taylor & Katharine L. Altemus, But the Lawyers
Said it was Okay. . . Revisiting the Role of Legal Opinions in Patent Litigation, in PATENTS,
COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, PLI Order
Number 2909 (Practicing Law Institute 2004), available at 801 PLI/Pat 761, 768 (Westlaw)
("[T]he best evidence that the defendant acted in good faith is likely to be found in whether it
contacted patent counsel upon learning of a potential infringement problem and whether it followed the legal advice received."); Atmel Corp. v. Silicon Storage Tech. Inc., 202 F.Supp.2d
1096, 1102-08 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (court found willful infringement based solely on the defendant's
failure to obtain an adequate opinion).
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court to determine if there was willful infringement, the Federal Circuit has
identified several factors to consider. 29 These factors include:
(i) whether the infringer deliberately copied the patentee's idea
or design; (ii) whether the infringer, when he knew of the other's patent protection, investigated the scope of the patent and
formed a good faith belief that it was invalid or that it was not
infringed; (iii) the infringer's behavior as a party to the litigation[;] . . . (iv) the infringer's size and financial condition; (v)
the closeness of the infringement determination; (vi) the duration of the infringer's misconduct; (vii) remedial actions taken
by the infringer; (viii) the infringer's motivation for harm; and
(ix) whether the infringer attempted to conceal its misconduct.3 °
These factors are commonly referred to as the Read factors. 3' When evaluating
the Read factors, the proper test is whether the totality of circumstances suggests
that the patent infringement was willful. 32 Although the Federal Circuit articulated these factors to aid courts in determining willful infringement, the history
of the willful infringement doctrine and its application by courts has lead to several problems 33 that the Federal Circuit has been unable to remedy after several
attempts.34

29

See Bott v. Four Star Corp., 807 F.2d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Read Corp. v. Portec,

Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
30
Lee, supra note 27, at 170; see Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 827.
31
See Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 827. The Federal Circuit in the Read Corp. cases expanded on
the factors set forth in Bott v. Four Star Corp., and the combinations of these factors have since
been labeled the Read factors. See Lee, supra note 27, at 170.
32
Imonex Servs. v. W.H. Munzprufer Dietmar Trenner GmbH, 408 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2005); see nCube Corp. v. SeaChange Int'l, Inc., 436 F.3d 1317, 1323-24 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
33
See infra Part II.B
34
For a complete history see Lee, supra note 27. The Federal Circuit has attempted to modify
the standard for determining willful infringement several times without success. See Read Corp.,
970 F.2d 816; Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (court held that there is no longer an adverse inference if no opinion of counsel is
introduced into evidence); In re Echostar Commc'ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (court
attempted to define the scope of the waiver to the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine when defendant uses opinion of counsel defense).
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Problems with the Willful Infringement Doctrine Priorto In Re Seagate

1.

The Standard for Willful Infringement
is More Akin to Negli35
gence in the Pre-In Re Seagate Era

As previously mentioned, the standard set forth by the Federal Circuit
for determining willful infringement was a low threshold standard 36 that permitted courts to adversely infer willful infringement if the alleged infringer did not
produce evidence of an opinion of counsel.37 Since the appropriate standard
was an affirmative duty of care, which required an opinion of counsel, 38 defendants were found to have willfully infringed on a patent holder's rights even
when a good faith attempt was made to determine whether or not their actions
would in fact amount to unlawful infringement. 39 The application of the standard by the Federal Circuit demonstrates that although the term "willfulness" is
used most generally to mean voluntary and intentional,40 the level of intent in
willful patent infringement is more akin to that of negligence.'" Under this low
threshold standard, mere knowledge of a patent would almost certainly lead to a

35
36

See infra note 39.
See supra Part I.

37

See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. Although the Federal Circuit articulated
several factors to be used by the court in making a determination of willful infringement, the
courts applied these factors loosely and found willful infringement for a variety of reasons.
38
See Underwater Devices v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
39
Smith Eng'g Co., Inc. v. Eisenmann Corp., 28 Fed. Appx. 958, 965 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In
Smith Engineering,the patent infringer knew of the existing patent which he believed was similar
to one of his products. Id. To determine whether his actions were infringing upon the existing
patent, he sent the patent to the engineering department to study the patent. Id. The engineering
department determined there was no infringement. Id. The Court held that this was insufficient to
satisfy the affirmative duty of care and held that the alleged infringer was a willful infringer. Id.
Smith Engineering demonstrates that the good will of the alleged infringer was irrelevant to the
willful infringement determination prior to In re Seagate.
40
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
41
See In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Although the court's "primary consideration is whether the infringer, acting in good faith and upon due inquiry, had sound
reason to believe that it had the right to act in the manner that was found to be infringing," this
reasoning cannot be reconciled when analyzing the actual application of willful infringement by
the Federal Circuits. SRI Int'l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc. 127 F.3d 1462, 1464-65 (Fed.
Cir. 1997). Compare Smith Engineering, 28 Fed. Appx. at 965 (under the old standard for willful
infringement, the court found willful infringement even though the infringer obtained an opinion
from several engineers who studied the patent together with the alleged infringing product and
concluded there was no infringement), with Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 526 F.Supp.2d
84, 104-07 (D. Mass. 2007) (under the post-In re Seagate standard, the court concluded that obtaining opinion from a scientist could defeat a charge of willful infringement).
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de facto presumption of willful infringement in future litigation.42 Since the
threshold standard for willful infringement was so low, and the treble damages
as a consequence of a finding of willful infringement were so high, 43 the standard made the court's determination of willfulness the paramount issue in a patent infringement case.44 This reasoning led patentees to plead willful infringement as a tactic or strategy, and not on the merits of the case.45
This adverse inference was unique to patent law and highly unfavorable
to defendants. 46 As a result, the Federal Circuit attempted to correct this problem in Knorr-Bremse Systeme FuerNutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp.4 7 The
Federal Circuit's decision in Knorr-Bremse eliminated the application of the
adverse inference on the defendant when he or she did not offer evidence of
obtaining an opinion of counsel.48 However, although the adverse inference was
eliminated, defendants still had an affirmative duty of care to determine whether
they infringed known patents. 49 Defendants still had to show that they "affirmatively investigated the scope of a patent and formed a good faith belief that the
patent [was] either invalid or not infringed., 50 Although defendants benefited
from the elimination of the adverse inference, the Federal Circuit did not give
any additional guidance as to how a defendant could meet his affirmative duty
of care.5' Therefore, the best and most common defense against willful infringement remained obtaining an opinion of counsel,52 as demonstrated by the
fact that several courts held that obtaining counsel opinions was the best evi-

42

Ray Lupo et al., United States: FederalCircuitAdopts New "Objective Recklessness" Stan-

dard For Willful Patent Infringement, MONDAQ, Aug. 23, 2007, http://www.mondaq
.com/article.asp?articleid=51592.
See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
44
See Marcia Coyle, Federal Circuit Eyes Attorney-Client Privilege Waiver in Key Patent
Case, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, May 23, 2007, http://www.law.comjsp/article.jsp?id=
1179824708355. As one of the attorneys for the defendant in In re Seagate stated: "It's at the
forefront of the court's attention and the rest of the case has taken a backseat as a result." Id.
45
See infra Part IV.C.1.
46
See Lupo, supra note 42.
47
383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
48
See id. at 1341. The Court in Knorr-Bremse eliminated the adverse inference for several
reasons including the impact of the adverse inference on the attorney-client privilege, the inference was based on unjustified presumptions, and the inference negated a defendant's efforts to
avoid willful infringement. See Lee, supra note 27, at 177.
49
See Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1348 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
50
See Lee, supra note 27, at 178.
43

51

Id.

Maxwell J. Peterson et al., The Coming Tidal Wave of Enhanced Damage Awards,
Oct. 2006, available at http:llwww.iptoday.comIpdf/2006/10/
Petersen%20-%200ct2006.pdf.
52

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TODAY,
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dence of demonstrating good faith.53 In effect, the only thing that the KnorrBremse decision did was leave uncertainty as to whether or not a potential infringer should seek an opinion from an attorney before using a potentially patented product.- 4 Additionally, although a court was no longer permitted to instruct the jury to make the adverse inference if no opinion of counsel was given, 55 the jury instructions were still permitted to state that no opinion of counsel
was obtained. 56 The possible inferences that the trier of fact could make remained the same
under this standard, despite no adverse inference instructions
57
given.
being
2.

The Willful Infringement Doctrine's Negative Effects on the
Attorney-Client Privilege

One of the biggest problems with the pre-In re Seagate standard for
willful infringement was not only the importance of obtaining opinion of counsel, but the effects that using an opinion of counsel defense had on the attorneyclient privilege. 58 Prior to In re Seagate, if an alleged infringer provided an opinion of counsel defense, he or she summarily waived the attorney-client privilege for all subject matter pertaining to the alleged infringement. 59 Further, because there was an affirmative duty to obtain an opinion of counsel, the rule
essentially required the alleged infringer to waive the attorney-client privilege. 6°
Even though the Federal Circuit attempted to correct this problem in KnorrBremse by holding that alleged infringers did not have to produce an opinion of
counsel, the Federal Circuit and other courts stressed that providing evidence of

See Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 353 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1078 (C.D. Cal.
2004) (court articulated that obtaining opinions of counsel continues to be essential in willfulness
determinations); Cabot Corp. v. Solution Tech., 122 F. Supp. 2d 599, 637 (W.D. N.C. 2000).
54
See Lee, supra note 27, at 178.
55
See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337,
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
56
See Engineered Prods. Co. v. Donaldson Co., 147 Fed. Appx. 979, 991 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
57
See id.; Applera Corp. v. MJ Research, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 2d 233, 243 (D. Conn. 2005) (the
court allowed the plaintiff to inform the jury of a defendant's failure to obtain an opinion because
the absence of the opinion is not outcome determinative).
58
This section will provide a brief analysis of the problems associated with using the opinion
of counsel defense on the attomey-client privilege. For a more detailed analysis of the opinion of
counsel defense and the effects on the attomey-client privilege, see Robert A. Matthews, Jr.,
Waiver ofAttorney-Client Privilege,7 ANNOTATED PAT. DIG. § 42:117 (2008).
59
See Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1344-45.
60
Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 (Fed. Cir.
1983); see also Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 181-82 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (court held that the duty entails obtaining the opinion of counsel before engaging in, or
continuing, any potentially infringing activity).
53
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6
opinion of counsel was the best defense to a claim of willful infringement. 1
Therefore, an alleged infringer did not have to produce an opinion of counsel,
but it was still the best type of evidence to defend against willful infringement.
The Knorr-Bremse decision put defendants in a difficult position, by requiring
them to decide between two evils 62 when defending against a willful infringement claim.
In the post-Knorr-Bremse era, the alleged infringer was said to be in a
"Quantum dilemma, '' 63 that is, the alleged infringer had to decide whether to
produce evidence that an opinion of counsel was obtained (thus eliminating his
attorney-client privilege), or to not produce this type of evidence and hope that
other defenses would work. In other words, "accused infringers often faced a
Catch-22: either forgo the advice-of-counsel defense [to] maintain [the] attorney-client privilege and work-product immunity, or invoke
the defense [and]
64
communications."
damaging
potentially
of
risk [disclosure]
Shortly after the Federal Circuit issued its opinion in Knorr-Bremse, the
Court broadened the scope of the waiver of the attorney-client privilege in
EchoStar,6 5 which put potential infringers in an even more difficult position. In
EchoStar, the Court held that "when an accused infringer chooses to rely on an
opinion of counsel in defending an allegation of willful infringement, [the accused infringer] waives the attorney-client privilege with regard to any attorneyclient communications relating to the same subject matter., 66 District Courts
have since applied the Federal Circuit's holding in EchoStar very broadly.6 7
Thus, prior to In re Seagate, an opinion of counsel defense not only waived the
attorney-client privilege between the alleged infringer and the attorney whose
opinion was disclosed, but the attorney-client privilege was waived for all

61

See supra note 27; Steelcase Inc. v. Haworth, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1195 (W.D. Mich. 1997)

(court held that a defendant asserting an advice of counsel defense must be deemed to have
waived the privilege as to all communications between counsel and client concerning the subject
matter of the opinion); Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. E'Lite Optik, Inc., 276 F.Supp.2d 1084 (D. Nev.
2003) (court held that by relying on the advice of counsel defense to the claim of willful infringement, defendant has waived the attorney-client privilege and work-product immunity to all documents pertaining these subject matter areas).
62
Lee, supra note 27, at 178.
63
Ronald M. Daignault et al., Willful Patent Infringement after Knorr-Bremse, 18 INTELL.
PROP. & TECH. L.J. 5 (2006). The term "Quantum dilemma" stands for the reasoning in the Federal Circuit's decision in Quantum Corp. v. Tandon Corp. where the court recommended that
there be separate trials on the issue of liability and willfulness to balance the equities in choosing
between waiving or not waiving privilege. 940 F.2d 642, 643-44 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
(A
See Susan M. Gerber et. al., In re Seagate: The Federal Circuit Scuttles Underwater Devices
And Narrows Privilege/Immunity Waiver, (2007) available at http://www.jonesday.com/pubs/
pubs..detail.aspx?pubID=-S4554.
65
In re EchoStar Commc'ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
66
Id. See Mark P. Kesslen et. al., The Patent Trial Bar Breathes A Sigh Of Relief: In re Seagate, METROPOLrrAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, Nov. 2007, at 51, availableat http://www.metrocorp
counsel.coVm/current.php?artType=view&artMonth=November&artYear=-2007&EntryNo=7445.
67

Id.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol111/iss2/11

10

2009l

Lanks: In Re Seagate: Effects and Future Development of Willful Patent I
WILLFUL PATENT INFRINGEMENT

communications and work product regarding infringement between the alleged
infringer and any attorney thereafter.6 8 As a result, the alleged infringer could
not escape the "Quantum dilemma" by hiring one attorney to give an opinion on
whether his or her activity constituted infringement, and thereafter hire another
attorney to defend him or her against a subsequent willful infringement claim.69
But, the Federal Circuit in EchoStar did not "specifically address the advice-ofcounsel defense as [it] applied to trial counsel's communications and work
product., 70 Therefore, courts were split as to whether the EchoStar decision
should be applied to trial counsel. 71 For this reason, the Federal Circuit again
addressed willful infringement, the scope of the waiver of the attorney-client
privilege, and work product doctrine in In re Seagate.72

III.
A.

IN RE SEAGATE:

A NEW ERA FOR WILLFUL PATENT INFRINGEMENT

The PartiesInvolved and the ProceduralHistory of In Re Seagate

Convolve, Inc., together with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(hereinafter "Convolve") held patents related to computer disk drive technology.73 Convolve sued Seagate, alleging willful infringement of their 473 patent.74
Seagate retained counsel, Gerald Sekimura, prior to the lawsuit to provide an
opinion concerning Convolve's patents. 75 Sekimura provide three written opinions concerning the validity and potential infringement of the 473 patent.76
See In re Echostar Commc'ns Corp., 448 F.3d at 1294; Kesslen, supra note 66. More specifically, the waiver extends to work product when the documents that embody a communication
between the attorney and client concern the subject matter of the case, such as a traditional opinion letter. However, the waiver does not extend to documents analyzing the law, facts, trial
strategy, and documents that reflect the attorney's mental impressions but were not given to the
client. In re EchoStarCommc'ns Corp., 448 F.3d at 1299.
69
In re EchoStar Commc'ns Corp., 448 F.3d at 1297.
70
See Gerber, supra note 64.
71 See Jason A. Crotty et. al., United States: In re Seagate Technology, LLC: The Federal
68

Circuit Will Address SignificantIssues Regarding Willful Infringement En Banc, (2007), available
at http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=45910. Compare Indiana Mills & Mfg., Inc. v.
Dorel Indus., Inc., 458 F. Supp. 2d 890 (S.D. Ind. 2006) (the Court applied EchoStar broadly to
cover trial counsel communications concerning infringement), with Intex Recreation Corp. v.
Team Worldwide Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2006) (the Court limited the waiver to all
communications to and from the counsel who gave the opinion as to whether defendant's actions
were in fact infringing but did not extend the waiver to all infringement subject matter with respect to defendant's trial counsel).
72
See Kesslen, supra note 66. The "Seagate decision, serve[d] to relieve many concerns
created by Echostarfor accused infringers and trial counsel." Id.
73 In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
74 Id. at 1366. The suit was originally filed alleging infringement of the 635 and 267 patent,
which subsequently was amended to infringement of the 473 patent. Id.
75 Id.
76

Id.
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began for the
Seagate then hired independent trial counsel once the litigation
77
purpose of defending against the willful infringement lawsuit.
Seagate notified Convolve of its intent to rely on Sekimura's written
opinions as a defense against the willful infringement claim and disclosed all
work product and communications from Sekimura regarding the infringement
claim to Convolve.78 However, Convolve moved to compel the discovery of all
communications and work product from Seagate's trial counsel. 79 The lower
court concluded that Seagate had waived their attorney-client privilege and
work product immunity for all counsel advising or representing Seagate concerning the subject matter of infringement, invalidity, and enforceability of the
473 patent.80 Seagate petitioned for a writ of mandamus based on the lower
court's rulings. 81 The Federal Circuit stayed the discovery orders and set out to
answer three questions:
1. Should a party's assertion of the advice of counsel defense to
willful infringement extend waiver of the attorney-client
82 privilege to communications with that party's trial counsel?
2. What is the effect of any such waiver on work-product immunity?
3. Given the impact of the statutory duty of care standard announced in Underwater Devices.... on the issue of waiver of
attorney-client privilege, should this court reconsider the decision 83in Underwater Devices and the duty of care standard itself?
The FederalCircuit'sAnalysis and Holding in In Re Seagate

B.

1.

Defining Willful Infringement in the Patent Law Context and
Setting the New Standard of Objective Recklessness

To answer the three questions set out above, 84 the Federal Circuit relied
on Supreme Court rulings,85 sister courts85hearing copyright infringement cases, 86
77

Id.

78

Id.

79

81

Id.
Id. at 1366-67.
Id. at 1367.

82

More specifically, the court will review In re Echostar, and discuss the validity of that opi-

80

nion which held that any disclosure by counsel waives all attorney-client privileges to any counsel, pertaining the same subject matter as the disclosure. See supra Part I.
83
In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1367.
84
Id.
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and lower courts discussing punitive damages in the civil liability context.8 7 In
the In re Seagate opinion, the Federal Circuit first analyzed the meaning of the
term willfulness in the civil context.88 The Federal Circuit noted that other
courts hearing copyright infringement claims have employed "a recklessness
standard for enhancing statutory damages," and although the term "willful" is
not defined by the copyright statute, 89 it has been consistently defined as including reckless behavior.9° Similarly, the Federal Circuit noted that in civil liability
actions the Supreme Court has defined willfulness to include reckless behavior 91
because it comports with "common law usage which treated actions in 'reckless
disregard' of the law as 'willful' violations." 92 In contrast, the Federal Circuit
noted that its application of the term willful in the patent infringement context
was not analogous to the Supreme Court's definition of the term "willful." 93
The Federal Circuit reasoned that the standard set forth in Underwater Devices,94 "sets a lower threshold for willful infringement that is more akin to negligence... [and] fails to comport with the general understanding of willfulness in
the civil context. 95 The Federal Circuit, attempting to comport with the Supreme Court's definition of willfulness, then overruled UnderwaterDevices and
held that "proof of willful infringement.., requires at least a showing of objective recklessness. 96 The Federal Circuit additionally stated that the intent of the
alleged infringer is irrelevant to this objective inquiry. 9

85
86

See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2203-09 (2007).
See Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAM, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 112 (2nd. Cir. 2001) (the court held

that willfulness in the copyright context means that the defendant recklessly disregarded the possibility that its actions represented infringement).
87
Lupo, supra note 42.
88
In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1370.
89
Id.; See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006).
90
See Lupo, supra note 42.
91
See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2203-09 (2007). See, e.g., McLaughlin
v. Tichland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 132-36 (1988).
92
See Safeco Ins. Co., 127 S. Ct. at 2208; W. KEErON ET AL., LAW OF TORTS § 34, 212 (5th
ed.1984) ("Although efforts have been made to distinguish" the terms "willful," "wanton," and
"reckless," "such distinctions have consistently been ignored, and the three terms have been
treated as meaning the same thing, or at least as coming out at the same legal exit.").
93
In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
94
Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
95
In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371. Compare Safeco, 127 S. Ct. at 2201, with Smith Engineering Co., Inc. v. Eisenmann Corp., 28 Fed. Appx. 958, 965 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (the court held that
even though the alleged infringer made an objectively good faith effort to determine that his actions did not constitute infringement by obtaining opinions for engineers, the court found willful
infringement).
96
In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
97

Id.
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The Court went on to define the term recklessness as used in patent infringement to include its standard use in the civil context. 98 In the civil context,
the general meaning of recklessness is a person who acts "in the face of an unjustifiable high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that is should be
known." 99 Therefore, in willful patent infringement cases, the Federal Circuit
held that a plaintiff must show by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged
infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that the alleged infringer's
actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.' °° The Court then articulated
the proper standard, derived from civil cases, for determining willful infringement. This standard has two prongs:
1. First, a patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence
that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood
that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent. The
state of mind of the accused infringer is not relevant to this objective inquiry.
2. Only after this threshold objective standard is satisfied, the
patentee must also demonstrate that this objectively-defined risk
(determined by the record developed in the infringement proceeding) was either known or so obvious that it should have
been known to the accused infringer. 01
Furthermore, the Court held that the intent of the alleged infringer is irrelevant. ° 2 Although the Federal Circuit articulated this new standard, they "[left]
it to future cases to further develop the application of this standard."' 3 However, the Court did provide insight into the future application of the objective recklessness standard, which will be discussed in Part TV.
2.

Using the Opinion of Counsel Defense in Willful Patent Infringement Cases and the Effects of This Defense on the Attorney-Client Privilege

After assessing and defining the new two-prong standard for willfulness, the Federal Circuit addressed the scope of the waiver of the attorney-client

98

See id.

99

W. KEETON ET AL., LAW OF TORTS § 34, 213-14 (5th ed. 1984).
100 In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371. See Safeco, 127 S. Ct. at 2215 (court held that objectively

assessing the possibility of a high risk of harm is the essence of recklessness).
101
See In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371; Clonts, supra note 27, at 11.
102
See In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1372; Franklin Elec. Co. v. Dover Corp., No. 05-C-598-S,
2007 WL 5067678 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 15, 2007).
103 See In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
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privilege when the alleged infringer asserts an opinion of counsel defense.' °4
The Federal Circuit reasoned that a change must be made to the standard for the
proper scope of the attorney-client waiver for several reasons. 10 5 First, the Court
articulated the importance of the attorney-client privilege, reasoning that this
privilege is the oldest of privileges under the common law.10 6 Next, the Supreme Court has recognized the importance of protecting trial counsel's thoughts. °7 Last, the Court determined that District Courts have been applying the
scope of the waiver of the attorney-client
privilege differently when the facts of
08
the case are relatively the same.'
To determine the proper scope of the waiver, the Court distinguished
the functions and roles of an accused infringer's opinion counsel and trial counsel.' °9 The purpose of his or her opinion counsel is to provide an "objective
assessment for making informed business decisions," while the purpose of trial
counsel is to "[focus] on litigation strategy and [evaluate] the most successful
manner of presenting a case to a judicial decision maker."' 10 The Court then
went on to balance the importance of extending the waiver to trial counsel for a
plaintiff with the importance of protecting the attorney-client privilege.'
This balancing test first requires an analysis of the different objectives
in pre-litigation and post-litigation conduct. The Federal Circuit first stated that
the purpose of filing an infringement complaint is to recover damages for pre-

105

1372.
Id. at 1372-73.

106

Id. at 1372. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (court recognized

104 Id. at

the importance of the attorney-client privilege to "encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of
law and administration of justice").
107
See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). The Supreme Court articulated the importance of protecting trial counsel's thoughts as:
it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from
unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel. Proper preparation of a client's case demands that he assemble information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories
and plan his strategy without undue and needless interference. That is the historical and the necessary way in which lawyers act within the framework of
our system of jurisprudence to promote justice and to protect their clients' interests.
Id. at 510-511.
108
See In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1372-73. For a detailed analysis on how district courts have
applied and extended the waiver to the attorney-client privilege, see Robert A. Matthews, Jr.,
District Court Cases, in 7 ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 42:121 (2007).
109 See In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1373.
110 Id. at 1373. See Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int'l, Inc., 246
F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the court articulated that "defenses prepared [by trial counsel].
are not equivalent to the competent legal opinion of non-infringement or invalidity").
i See In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1374.
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litigation infringement. 1 2 Next, the Court noted that post-litigation infringement can be prevented by seeking a preliminary injunction. 13 Therefore, the
Court reasoned that a willfulness claim in the original complaint must "necessarily be grounded exclusively in the accused infringer's pre-filing conduct" and
communications made to trial counsel will have little, if any, relevance in supporting the original claim. 1 4 For this reason, the Court reasoned that there is
little importance in extending the waiver to trial counsel which does not outweigh the great importance of protecting the attorney-client privilege.' 15 The
Federal Circuit then held that asserting the advice of counsel defense does not
constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privilege to trial counsel; however,
courts can nonetheless exercise their discretion in unique circumstances, such as
when the alleged infringer uses acts of chancery, as discussed in Section
IV(B)(1), to extend the waiver."16
3.

The Effects of Using the Opinion of Counsel Defense on the
Work Product Doctrine

Just as the Federal Circuit determined the scope of the waiver of the attorney-client privilege by weighing the interest of the party seeking to extend
the waiver and the importance of the principles behind the attorney-client privilege, 117 the Court also used the same analysis for determining the scope of the
waiver for the work product doctrine.1 8 First, the Court noted that the purpose
of the work product doctrine is to promote an attorney's preparation in
representing a client, and this interest must be weighed against the importance to
the patentee of retrieving evidence." 9 Next, the Court looked at several District
Court decisions that held a waiver of the work product doctrine ends when the
litigation begins. 120 The Court also noted that even the Supreme Court
has ap121
proved a narrow restriction on the scope of the work product waiver.
112

Id. at 1374.

113

Id.
Id.

114

115
116
"7

118
"9

120

See id. at 1373-74.
Id. at 1374.
See supra Part II.B.2.
See In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1375-76.

See In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 624 (4th Cir. 1988).
See Dunhall Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Discus Dental, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1202, 1205-06 (C.D.

Cal. 1998) (court held that the advice of counsel defense waives the work product doctrine up to
the time that the lawsuit was filed); Aspex Eyewear, Inc., v. E'Lite Optik, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d
1084, 1095-96 (court reasoned that if the willful infringement is ongoing, the waiver of the work
product doctrine would extend past the point that the lawsuit was filed).
121 See In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1376; United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975). Nobles
was a criminal case where the court held that the waiver of the work product doctrine is limited in
nature and the court will not allow a fishing expedition into files. Id.Although this was a crimi-

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol111/iss2/11

16

20091

Lanks: In Re Seagate:
Effects
and Future
Development of Willful Patent I
WILLFUL
PATENT
INFRINGEMENT

The Federal Circuit reasoned that such a narrow restriction complies
with the purposes of filing a patent infringement claim, and even with such a
narrow restriction, plaintiffs are allowed to discover materials used by opinion
counsel prior to the lawsuit.1 22 However, once the litigation begins, the importance of the work product doctrine outweighs the importance of extending the
waiver to trial counsel.123 Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that asserting an
opinion of counsel defense does not extend the waiver of the work product doctrine to trial counsel and the discovery of work product is limited to such materials used by opinion counsel prior to the filing of the lawsuit. 24
IV. POST-INRE SEAGATE: THE EFFECTS AND FUTURE

DEVELOPMENT OF

INRE

SEAGATE'S NEW WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT DOCTRINE

A.

The Application and Future Development of the New Objective Recklessness Standard

The Federal Circuit articulated the new standard for determining willful
infringement; however, the Court did not fully develop how this standard was to
be applied. 125 This section will discuss how the new standard has begun to be
developed in case law and how this standard will most likely be developed in
future cases. Although the Court did not fully develop the application of the
objective recklessness standard, the Court did suggest and give insight as to how
this standard should be applied. 26 First, in determining the proper meaning of
"willfulness" the court analyzed several other types of civil cases, including
copyright infringement cases and cases in which courts have granted punitive
damages.' 27 Second, the Court suggested that the Read "standards of commerce"1 28 factors should
be considered by courts when determining willful pa129
tent infringement.

nal case, the reasoning also applied in In re Seagate. Here, the court, at trial gave plaintiff access to
materials from opinion counsel but did not let plaintiff go on a "fishing expedition into [all of
counsel's] files." Id. at 240. Thus, the waiver in In re Seagate was limited in nature in the same
regard as in the Nobles case.
122
See supra Part III.B.2.
123 See In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1376.
124
Id.
125

126
127
128

See supra Part III.
See In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1360; supra Part III.
See In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1360; see supra note 86.
See In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371 n.5; see Depomed, Inc. v. Ivax Corp., 532 F. Supp. 2d

1170 (N.D. Cal. 2007). The "standards of commerce" refer to the factors set forth in Read and
Bott. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
129 In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
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The Application and Analysis of the Objective Recklessness
Standard in Post-In Re Seagate Cases

Under the pre-ln re Seagate affirmative duty of care standard, the burden was on the defendant to demonstrate that he or she acted in good faith and
relied on an opinion of counsel. 30 The post-In re Seagate standard, however,
"abandoned the notion that a would-be infringer has an affirmative duty of care
to ensure that he does not infringe."' 3' The elimination of the affirmative duty
of care shifts the burden onto the patentee to prove willful infringement by demonstrating that the "infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that
its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent." 132 Once this threshold
inquiry is met, the patentee must then demonstrate that this objectively high risk
was known or was so obvious that it should have been known to the accused
infringer. 133 The patentee bears the burden of proving these two prongs by clear
and convincing evidence.134 Although the facts demonstrating infringement
may overlap the facts needed to prove willful infringement, the patentee has to
demonstrate more in the post-In re Seagate era than just showing that the defendant knew he or she was infringing.' 35 Courts at various levels have attempted
to articulate what additional facts the patentee has to prove in order to successfully litigate a willful patent infringement claim.
In order to determine whether or not the defendant's infringement was
willful, the District Court of Massachusetts in Cohesive Technologies136 articulated several factors similar to the Read factors.137 Although these factors are
similar to the Read factors, there is enough of a difference to suggest that these
factors will in fact replace the Read factors.' 38 These factors consider:
(1) whether there was a bona fide disagreement regarding patent
invalidity or infringement, (2) whether the infringer solicited or
followed the advice of counsel, (3) whether there was continued
infringement after notice of probable infringement was received, (4) whether there was a degree of similarity between the
130

See supra note 28.

131

See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., No. SACV 05-467-JVS (RNBx), 2007 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 86627, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2007).
132 Cohesive Technologies, Inc. v. Waters Corp., 526 F. Supp. 2d 84, 103 (D. Mass. 2007).
133

Id.

Id.; see Comark Commc'n Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
See Computer Associates Intern., Inc. v. Simple.com, Inc., 247 F.R.D. 63 (E.D.N.Y. 2007);
Cohesive Technologies, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 84. Under the pre-In re Seagate standard the effect of
the patentee proving that the defendant did in fact infringe and that the defendant knew of the preexisting patent was, in most cases, sufficient for the court to find willful infringement.
136 Cohesive Technologies, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 84.
137
See supra text accompanying note 31.
138 See Cohesive Technologies, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 84.
134
135
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patented and accused devices, (5) whether the infringer took efforts to avoid infringement, and (6) whether
the infringer was
139
indemnified against infringement CoStS.
Additionally, although there can be no adverse inference made if the defendant
fails to provide evidence of obtaining a counsel opinion, a minority of courts
have held that this can be considered by courts and juries when reviewing the
totality of
circumstances in determining whether the defendant's actions were
n°
willful.
In applying this standard, the courts must determine what evidence the
patentee has put forth to prove each of the two prongs in the objective recklessness standard.
The court must first be provided with enough evidence to satisfy the first prong, whether there was an objectively high risk that the defendant's actions would in fact infringe. This prong cannot be met only by evi142
dence of the defendant's knowledge of the existing patent or state of mind,
because the Federal Circuit in In re Seagate expressly held that such evidence is
irrelevant to the objective recklessness standard. 43 For example, the plaintiff
cannot satisfy the first prong by providing evidence that the defendant, before
the alleged infringement occurred, attempted to procure a license from the patentee. 44 Similarly, the fact that letters were sent to the defendant prior to the
lawsuit being filed, accusing the defendant of infringement, or the fact that a
jury has found the defendant guilty of infringement, does not meet the patentee's burden to introduce clear and
convincing evidence that there was an objec5
tively high risk of infringement.14
Under the pre-In re Seagate standard, if a defendant did not provide
evidence of obtaining an opinion of counsel to demonstrate his or her good
faith, most courts would find that this lack of evidence demonstrated willful
infringement. 146 Additionally, even if the defendant did provide this evidence,
the low threshold standard for willful infringement still allowed the courts to
find for the patentee with little evidence to rebut the defendant's opinion of
counsel letter. 47 However, under the post-In re Seagate standard, evidence of
Id.; compare Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992), with Cohesive
Technologies, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 84.
140
See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., SACV 05-467-JVS (RNBx), 2007 U.S. Dist.
139

LEXIS 86627 at *6 (D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2007).
141
See supra Part II.B.
142
See Franklin Elec. Co. v. Dover Corp., No. 05-C-598-S, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84588
(W.D. Wis. Nov. 15, 2007).
143 See id.
144 Id.

TGIP, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 527 F. Supp. 2d 561 (E.D. Tex. 2007).
See supra Part II.B. 1.
147 Id.
145
146
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an opinion of counsel provides great weight to a finding that there was not an
objectively high risk that the defendant's actions would in fact infringe. 148 This
post-In re Seagate standard makes it incredibly hard to prove willful infringement when the defendant obtained an opinion of counsel prior49to committing the
conduct which the patentee alleges was willful infringement.1
2.

Applying Civil and Copyright Courts' Analysis of Punitive
Damages and Willful Copyright Infringement to Predict the Future Development of the Objective Recklessness Standard in
Willful Patent Infringement Cases

The post-In re Seagate standard is relatively new and thus far there has
not been adequate case law to develop the proper application of the objective
recklessness standard. This subsection will attempt to predict the future development and application of the objective recklessness standard by applying the
analysis used for making punitive damage determinations in civil cases and
copyright infringement cases. 150 The best starting point for this analysis will be
from the sister court cases mentioned in the In re Seagate opinion. 1 '
The most relevant case is Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Burr,'152 a
civil liability case that dealt with enhanced damages; it provides insight as to the
re-evaluation of the willful patent infringement doctrine.' 53 The Supreme Court
148
See TGIP, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 561. The court demonstrated the differences between the
burdens on the patentee and the defendant under the pre-In re Seagate and post-In re Seagate
standard, and reasoned:
If [the defendant] had the burden of proof, this evidence [of obtaining an opinion of counsel] would not conclusively prove that [the defendant] was objectively reasonable. However, [the patentee] had the burden to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that [the defendant] knew, or should have known,
that there was an objectively high likelihood that [he] was infringing on one or
both of the patents.
Id. at 579. The court found that providing evidence of two letters accusing the defendant of infringement, and the fact that the jury found infringement was only a "scintilla of the evidence
needed to meet the clear and convincing standard." Id.
149
Id.
15O Although the development of the objective recklessness standard is new, this standard was
set forth by the Court in In re Seagate by analyzing sister courts which have enhanced damages.
See supra Part III.B.1.
151

Id.

152

127 S. Ct. 2201 (2007).
Id. The court noted that willfulness was defined by statute in the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

153

Id. In patent law the situation is different because willfulness has been defined by case law, and
not by statute. Id. The Court then noted that in patent law, asserting willful infringement was
more of a strategy, and this is something that the Federal Circuit needs to address. Id. The Judge
writing the opinion for this case suggested that a more heightened pleading standard would be
appropriate because the affirmative duty of care in willful patent infringement is more akin to
negligence. Id.; see Charles S. Barquist, The Impact of Recent Federal Circuit Decisions on
Strategiesfor Defending Claims of Willful Infringement: Opinion Letters, Representation Issues
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in Safeco noted that willfully failing to comply with the Fair Credit Reporting
Act ("FCRA") goes not only to acts known to violate the FCRA, but also to acts
which amount to a reckless disregard of the statutory duty.1m In determining
what a reckless disregard of a statutory duty is, the Supreme Court in Safeco
quoted from the Restatement (Second) of Torts:'
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of
another if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which
it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to
know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not
only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical
harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater
than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent. 156
Thus, a defendant, in the context of the FCRA, does not act in "reckless
disregard unless the action is not only a violation under a reasonable reading of
the statute's terms, but shows that the company ran a risk of violating the law
substantially greater than the risk associated with a reading that was merely
careless."' 157 Thus, the Court in Safeco attempted to draw a line between a party's mere negligence in reading the statute's terms and applying it to the party's
conduct, and a party risking a violation of the law from facts which would lead a
reasonable
man to believe that his actions would in fact cause harm to anoth158
er.
In applying this reasoning to willful patent infringement cases and the
objective recklessness standard, it is not hard to predict the outcome of cases
where the defendant is asserting the opinion of counsel defense. Although there
is no statutory definition of willful infringement, there is a statutory definition of
patent infringement which includes: "whoever without authority makes, uses,
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports
into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, [sic], infringes the patent.' 59 Therefore, in order to prove that a defendant
and the Scope of the Waiver of Privilege, in PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY
PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, PLI Order Number 11589 (Practicing Law Institute 2007);

availableat 910 PLI/Pat 1087, 1109-10 (Westlaw).
154
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201, 2208 (2007); see also McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 132-33 (1988) (court held that the term "willful," as used in a limitation provision for actions under the Fair Labor Standards Act, covers claims of reckless violation).
155
§ 500, p. 587 (1963-1964).
156

Safeco, 127 S. Ct. at 2215 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965)).

157 Id.
158

Id.

159

35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). Although there are several other sections which define different
types of infringement, for the purposes of this analysis, §271 (a) definition of infringement will be
sufficient.
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willfully infringed upon a patent, the patentee must prove that the defendant
acted in the face of facts which suggest that his actions were in fact infringing. 60 More specifically, when reading the statute on patent infringement, a
reasonable person would have believed that his or her actions did in fact constitute infringement. One way to prove this would be to assert that the patentee
does in fact have a valid patent and the defendant makes, offers to sell, or sells
this patent.161 Although there are many requirements that a patent may be missing,1 62 which would then invalidate the patent, a reasonable person looking to
these requirements, knowing of an existing patent, should at least know that he
or she needs to get an opinion of counsel to demonstrate good faith. To demonstrate the good faith needed to successfully defend against a claim of willful
patent infringement, the defendant must prove that he investigated his actions
and had a reasonable belief that he was not infringing.' 63 The best way to prove
such good faith is still obtaining opinion of counsel.
An opinion of counsel letter may state that the defendant's actions were
not infringing for a variety of reasons, such as invalidity of the patent, noninfringement, or unenforceability of the patent. 164 Most cases in which the defendant asserts the opinion of counsel defense will come down to how the court
interprets the defendant's actions in regard to the opinion letter. 165 Just as the
Supreme Court in Safeco attempted to draw a line between mere negligence and
risking a violation of the law from facts which would lead a reasonable man to
believe that his actions would in fact cause harm to another, courts determining
160

See supra note 148.

161

See supra note 159.

162

35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). Section 101 defines the validity of a patent as: "Whoever invents

or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor [sic], subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title." Id. For a more detailed analysis on the validity of patents see
generally Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., PartL Treatise on the Law of Patentability, Validity
and Infringement, CHISUM ON PATENTS (2007).
163

See supra note 41.

164

Robert A. Matthews, Jr., Subject-Matter Waiver Generally Applies-Waiver Generally

Limited to Issue Relied on to Defend Willfulness, 7 ANNOTATED PAT. DIG. § 42:113 (2008).
165

See Maxwell J. Peterson, The Coming Tidal Wave of Enhanced Damage Awards, INTELL.

PROP. TODAY, Oct. 2006 at 28-29, available at http://www.iptoday.compdf/2006/10/PetersenOct2006.pdf. Prior to In re Seagate,
[b]ased on analysis of 143 patent infringement cases between 1999-2000
where willfulness was decided at trial, willful infringement was found in 51%
of the cases where an opinion of counsel was introduced as a defense, and in
63% of the cases where no opinion was introduced. Not only did opinions of
counsel fail to protect the defendants against willfulness charges half of the
time, but there was only a moderately higher chance of a willfulness finding if
no opinion had been obtained.
Id. at 28. However, in the post-In re Seagate era, the higher standard for willful infringement
would suggest that these statistics will increase dramatically when an opinion of counsel defense
is introduced.
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willful patent infringement must draw the line between what actions by the defendant were negligent-whether it be hiring an incompetent attorney for obtaining opinion of counsel or negligently reading an opinion of counsel letterand what actions were in the face of facts which a reasonable person would consider to be infringement.1 66 Since the defendant's state of mind is irrelevant, 67 a
several factors 68 to determine if the defendant acted in reckcourt will consider
69
1
less disregard.
Under the post-In re Seagate standard, an alleged infringer has not acted
recklessly so long as he or she sought and obtained competent legal advice be7
0
fore continuing in conduct which could potentially constitute infringement.1
An opinion of counsel will serve as legal advice and the alleged infringer may
rely on this opinion of counsel so long as the advice given was competent and
reliance on such advice was reasonable under the circumstances.1 71 To determine whether the advice was competent and whether it was reasonable to rely
on this advice, the court will consider:
(1) whether counsel examined the patent file history; (2) whether the opinions were oral or written; (3) the objectivity of the
opinions; (4) whether the attorneys rendering the opinions were
patent lawyers; (5) whether the opinions were detailed or merewhether material information was withly conclusory; and (6) 72
held from the attorney.
Under the post-In re Seagate standard, the opinion of counsel defense, if
competent and reasonably relied on, will most likely be a successful defense to
willful infringement in patent law cases.' 73 Nonetheless, an alleged infringer

See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
167
See In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
168 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., No. SACV 05-467-JVS (RNBx), 2007 U.S. Dist.
169
166

LEXIS 86627, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2007).
170 Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 268 F. Supp.2d 1117, 1121 (E.D. Cal. 2002); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
171 Chiron Corp., 268 F. Supp.2d at 1121.
172
Chiron Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d at 1121 (citing Comark Communications, Inc. v. Harris
Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). For a more detailed analysis of the development of
competent legal advice and whether it was reasonably relied on see Peterson, supra note 165.
173
See supra note 153; see also Cal. Table Grape Commc'n v. RB Sandrini, Inc., No. 1:06-CV00842-OWW-TAG, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48362 (E.D. Cal. June 27, 2007) (court held that a
successful opinion of counsel defense can be demonstrated with an opinion letter from competent
legal counsel and when under the totality of the circumstances the defendant has demonstrated
good faith); see also Vulcan Eng'g Co., Inc. v. FATA Aluminum, Inc., 278 F.3d 1366, 1378 (Fed.
Cir. 2002).
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will still be found to have willfully infringed if the alleged infringer obtained an
174
opinion of counsel letter but ignored or did not rely on the advice.
B.

The Effects of Using the Opinion of Counsel Defense on the AttorneyClient Privilegeand the Work Product Doctrine in Light of In Re Seagate

The effects that the In re Seagate decision will have on the waiver of the
attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine are still unclear. Although, "as a general proposition, asserting the advice of counsel defense and
disclosing [the] opinions of opinion counsel do not constitute waiver of the attorney-client privilege for communications with trial counsel,"'' 75 several questions concerning the attorney-client privilege have not been answered. First, the
In re Seagate decision left open the possibility that the attorney-client privilege
can be forfeited for acts of chicanery, 17 6 which, in the present context, can be
defined as using the opinion of counsel defense in a way that would trick a
court; however, the Federal Circuit did not articulate the acts which would forfeit the attorney-client privilege. 177 Second, the Federal Circuit left unanswered
to what extent the waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine applies to in-house counsel.178 The last question the Court left open is how
far does the waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine
extend when the counsel who gave the opinion concerning infringement was
also the trial counsel. The following subsections will attempt to answer the
above questions using 179
the reasoning set forth in In re Seagate and cases in the
post-In re Seagate era.
1.

The Exceptions to Using the Opinion of Counsel Defense that
Would Forfeit the Attorney-Client Privilege

The Federal Circuit in In re Seagate noted that some exceptions to the
attorney-client privilege would still be available; more specifically, acts of chicanery would forfeit the attorney-client privilege. 80 The Federal Circuit did not
See Comark, 156 F.3d at 1191.
175 Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp., No. 00 Civ. 5141 (GBD) (JCF), 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 87286 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2007); see In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F.3d
1360, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
176
See Convolve, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87286; see In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1374-75.
177 The court in Seagate left open exceptions to the attorney-client privilege where there are
174

acts of chicanery. See Chisum, supra note 4. "Chicanery" is a charming word, roughly meaning
the use of tricks to deceive, but the court does not elaborate on what might constitute chicanery in
the context of patent litigation. ld
178 See generally Convolve, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87286 (court set out to answer
the question
of whether the waiver of the attorney-client privilege extends to in-house counsel).
179
See supraPart H.
1s0

See In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1374.
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elaborate or give examples of what types of acts would be considered chicanery;
however, applying prior case law to patent law will most likely provide a starting point to define these types of acts. For example, courts in other civil contexts, have waived the attorney-client privilege when the purpose of the using
the attorney involved some act of bad faith.18' The Second Circuit held that bad
used for
faith arises when the attorney-client relationship is not genuine but only
182
the purpose of gaining confidentiality as a shield against disclosure.
In the area of patent infringement, there are situations where the court
may waive the attorney-client privilege where there has been some showing of
bad faith, such as where the alleged infringer withholds material information
from the opinion counsel to obtain an opinion in the light most favorable to the
alleged infringer, 183 or where a witness for the accused infringer lies under oath
concerning the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the opinion of
counsel. 84
2.

The Effects of Using the Opinion of Counsel Defense on the
Attorney-Client Privilege with Respect to In-House Counsel

In order to determine whether the opinion of counsel defense waives the
attorney-client privilege for in-house counsel of an alleged corporate infringer,
the courts must use the analysis set forth in In re Seagate. This analysis begins
with determining the role or function of the counsel with respect to the infringement claim. 185 The court must then determine the time at which the opi186
nion was given with respect to the filing date of the infringement claim.
Then, the court must balance the importance of the disclosure to the party seeking to extend the waiver with the principles behind the attorney client privilege. 87 The Federal Circuit in In re Seagate did not answer the question of
whether the waiver extends to the in-house counsel of the alleged corporate infringer; however, using the above88analysis, the District Court of New York in
Convolve answered this question.

181 In re Teleglobe Commc'ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345 (3rd Cir. 2007).
182 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 248 (2nd Cir. 1985).

183 See Katherine Pauley Barecchia, In re Seagate: How Claims and Defenses for Willful Infringement Have Changed, 20 No. 12 SOFrWARE L. BULL. 9 (2007).
184

Id.
185 See In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1374; see supraPart II.
186 Id. at 1374.
187

Id.

188 Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp., No. 00 Civ. 5141 (GBD) (JCF), 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 87286 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2007). After the decision in In re Seagate, the case was remanded to the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff sought discovery of information and
communications made between the in-house counsel and the counsel who wrote the opinion letter
used in the opinion of counsel defense. The court attempted to answer this question by
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The District Court in Convolve first noted that any communications
made, prior to litigation, by the in-house counsel to the defendant or the attorney
189
issuing the opinion of counsel is not protected by the attorney-client privilege.
Next, the Court answered the tougher question of whether post-litigation communications made by in-house counsel concerning the opinion could also be
subject to discovery. 190 The Court noted that this type of communication would
be of "marginal value" because the willfulness analysis focuses on pre-litigation
conduct and there is "no basis . . . for taking discovery of in-house counsel's
communications after the litigation was commenced."' 191 The plaintiff in Convolve attempted to side-step this reasoning by arguing that the "information possessed by in-house counsel that was not conveyed to opinion counsel should
also be discoverable in order to determine whether the [counsel's] opinions were
well-informed and therefore competent."' 92 The Court rejected this argument
for two reasons. First, the general rule is that non-disclosed work product is
immune from discovery, 193 and second, the information would not be important
194
to the party seeking to waive the privilege.
3.

The Effects of Using the Opinion of Counsel Defense on the
Attorney-Client Privilege with Respect to Trial Counsel

One last question left unanswered by the Federal Circuit in In re Seagate is what effect, if any, there would be on the waiver of the attorney-client
privilege and work product doctrine if the counsel who gave the opinion conFirst, identify[ing] whose opinion the defendants seek to rely on, that is,
whether it is the advice of outside opinion counsel or that of in-house counsel
themselves, or both.... Second, it may be necessary to separate the communications made and work product created before litigation was commenced
from what was generated after the case began.
Id. at *11-12.
189 See In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1370 (court held that asserting the advice of counsel defense
waives work product protection and the attorney-client privilege for all communications on the
same subject, as well as any documents memorializing attorney-client communications. However,
this waiver does not extend to work product that was not communicated to the alleged infringer);
See In re Echostar Commc'ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1299, 1302-03 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
190 Convolve, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87286.
191 Id. See In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1374.
192 Convolve, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87286. The patentee attempted to extend the waiver of
the attomey-client privilege under the theory that counsel's opinion was not a competent opinion
and as such, the defendant in relying on this opinion was reckless. Id.
193 See In re Echostar Commc'ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1303-05 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
194
Convolve, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87286 (the court reasoned that "information that in-house
counsel might have known but failed to convey to [the opinion counsel] would have been a subset
of the information known to [the] key... engineers who have already been deposed. Thus, even if
no privilege or immunity bars further discovery of in-house counsel's knowledge in relation to
[counsel's] opinions, that discovery would be cumulative and the burden and expense involved
would outweigh any likely benefit.").
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cerning infringement was also the trial counsel. 95 The answer to this question
might be intuitive, in that under the rules of ethics the opinion counsel will most
likely testify in litigation, preventing him or her from also serving as trial counsel. 196 This issue is therefore one not likely to be analyzed in future willful patent infringement cases. Nonetheless, under the In re Seagate analysis, the timing of the communications will play an important role with respect to the waiver
of the attorney-client privilege and, thus, a court would most likely reason that
all communications made by the trial counsel prior to litigation must be disclosed.
The Positive and Negative Effects on the Patent System and the Litigants Involved in Willful Patent Infringement Cases

C.

1.

Defendants Involved in Patent Litigation Rejoice in the Wake
of In Re Seagate

In re Seagate overruled the affirmative duty of care and placed the burden on the patentee to prove willful infringement. 197 This decision has raised
the bar for proving willful patent infringement and has lowered the cost to defend against such claims. 198 One purpose of the decision in In re Seagate was to
deter patentees from alleging willful patent infringement. Alleging willful patent infringement has become so prevalent in patent infringement cases that it
has become nothing more than a litigation strategy. 199 Prior to the decision in In

re Seagate, "[c]laims of willful infringement [were] made in more than ninety
percent of patent infringement suits, according to patent scholars and litigators,
in part because the standard for proving willful infringement is low and also
195

See In re Seagate, 497 F.3d 1370; Brian Ferguson, Seagate Equals Sea Change: The Feder-

al Circuit Establishes a New Test for Proving Willful Infringement and Preserves the Sanctity of

the Attorney-Client Privilege,24 SANTA CLARA CoMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 167 (2007).
196

See Ferguson, supra note 195, at 24; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7(a)

(2003):
A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be
a necessary witness unless:

(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in
the case; or

(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the
client.

Id.
197

See supra note 22.

198

See Steve Seidenberg, Sea Change; Seagate Creates Strict New Standardfor Proving Will-

ful Patent Infringement, INSIDE COUNSEL, (November 2007) at 20, http://www.insidecounsel.com

/section/litigation/1476?pagenum=l.
199 See supra note 153.
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because treble damages may be awarded.',2°° Thus, willfulness was in effect
plaguing the patent law system and patentees were claiming willful infringement without any factual basis at the time of the claim. 20 ' With the broad scope
of the waiver of the attorney-client privilege, almost all patentees alleged willful
infringement, not only for the treble damages, but also to get access to those
documents which would have otherwise been protected. 202 Pleading a claim for
willful infringement served not only as a basis for receiving treble damages, but
also as a way to gain insight into the defenses the alleged infringer might use.2 °3
As Jon W. Dudas, Under Secretary for the Intellectual Property Department of
Commerce, stated, "Willfulness is frequently alleged as a matter of course and
alleged infringers have to bear the expense of defending such actions." 2 ° The
decision in In re Seagate will prevent these adverse effects on the patent system
and the abused claim of willful patent infringement. 0 5
Another reason why In re Seagate overruled the Underwater Devices
standard was to promote uniformity in the area of patent law.20 6 There has been
a split in the lower courts regarding the extent of waiver to the attorney-client
privilege when an opinion of counsel defense is used by the alleged infringer,
and "questions about the scope of waiver of the attorney-client privilege have
generated extensive satellite litigation, dividing the district courts and creating
uncertainty and inconsistency in patent litigation. 20 7 Additionally, patent law
was the only area of law in which a party who seeks to defend his conduct by a
defense of good-faith through a reliance on a separate attorney opinion waived
the confidentiality of trial counsel communications.2 8 For this reason, in patent
law, patentees were using the willful infringement standard as a tactic to "know
[their] adversary's strategy and thought processes [which is] a huge advan200

See Marcia Coyle, Federal Circuit Eyes Attorney-Client Privilege Waiver in Key Patent

Case, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, (May 23, 2007), available at http://www.law.com
/jsp/article.jsp?id=1 179824708355; see Kimberly A. Moore, Empirical Statistics on Willful Patent
Infringement, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 227, 232 (2004).
201
See Moore, supra note 200, at 232.
202 Id. at 232-33.
203

Id.

204

Jon W. Dudas, testimony, Patent Revision CQ Congressional Testimony, (June 5, 2007).
See Seidenberg, supra note 198, at 20.
See Ferguson, supra note 195, at 167.
Coyle, supra note 200. In regards to the waiver of the attorney-client privilege, one suppor-

205
206
207

ter of Seagate stated:
Any trial lawyer knows it is hard to work up a case properly with the other
side's lawyer listening in. Yet that is what the lower court ordered here, [referring to the lower court in Seagate].... It's an opportunity to bring some logic
and reasonableness to this area of the law and to solve a problem unique to patent litigation.
Id.
208

,,
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tage. ' '20 9 No other area of law had this adverse effect on a defendant's trial
strategy.
Additionally, in the pre-In re Seagate era, alleged infringers were basically required to get an opinion of counsel letter.21 0 Manufacturers like Seagate
Technologies were receiving up to ten letters a day from patent holders alleging
infringement, 21' and prior to the In re Seagate decision, these types of letters
would insist that the manufacturer obtain an opinion of counsel letter to defend
against a subsequent willful infringement claim.2 12 Opinion of counsel letters
were not cheap and could range between $50,000 and $100,000 per opinion.21 3
Prior to In re Seagate, the patent system "influence[d] the decision-making
processes for these technology-producing organizations through the economic
consequences (the costs of litigating an average patent case are estimated to be
one to four million dollars) and time costs resulting from actual and potential
patent infringement litigation, settlements, and liability rulings. 2 14 Prior to In
re Seagate, manufacturers would have to weigh the costs of being sued for infringement against the cost of obtaining an opinion letter.215 Even if companies
still had an affirmative duty of care, under the pre-In re Seagate standard, the
cost of obtaining a "competent opinion [for every claim] . . . could be in the

hundreds-of-thousands of dollars. 2 16 This would make obtaining opinion letters
impossible for smaller companies, and larger companies might have to make a
"reasonable business decision ... not to pay for this legal advice. 217
In the post-In re Seagate era, companies both small and large must still
make these types of business decisions; however, under the new standard, potential infringers have other options to demonstrate good faith, such as seeking
opinions from engineers to demonstrate that the alleged infringer did not believe
that their actions constituted infringement. 218 "[T]he Seagate decision should
See Catherine McLean, U.S. Court Eases Patent Rules, Breaking News from globeandmail.com (August 21, 2007), http://www.theglobeandmail.comservletlPage/document/v5/content
/subscribe?user-URL=http://www.theglobeandmail.com%2Fservlet%2Fstory%2FRTGAM.20070
209

821 .wseagatee0821%2FBNStory%2FBusiness%2Fhome&ord=14342756&brand=theglobeandma

il&forcejlogin=true.
210
211
212
213
214

See supra note 53.
Coyle, supra note 200.
See supra note 60.
See Coyle, supra note 200.
Wrzesinski, supra note 13, at 197.

See Seidenberg, supra note 198, at 20. Michael Dzwonczyk, a patent litigator, stated that
"The Seagate decision changes the calculus of the economics involved in any decision to commercialize a would-be infringing product ... [and] [i]n some cases the decision to infringe may
simply involve the acceptance of a reduced profit margin by the infringer if a reasonable royalty is
awarded after a finding of infringement." Id.
216
Michael J. Bonella, A Reasonable, Balanced Answer to In Re Seagate Tech., INTELL. PROP.
TODAY, (August 2007), http://www. iptoday.con/articlesf2007-08-bonella.asp.
217
Id.
218
Cohesive Technologies, Inc. v. Waters Corp., 526 F. Supp. 2d 84, (D.Mass. 2007).
215
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not be interpreted as a reason to stop seeking opinions of counsel with respect to
the patent rights of others; ' '21 9 but the decision in In re Seagate does suggest that
other evidence could be used to demonstrate good faith, so long as the alleged
infringer can demonstrate that he or she did not act recklessly in the face of an
objectively high risk of harming the patent holder. 220 Even with this new standard, most companies are risk averse and will obtain opinion letters as an insurance policy against claims of willful infringement.22' Since the burden is on the
patentee to demonstrate objective recklessness by clear and convincing evidence, an opinion letter still may be the best evidence to demonstrate good
faith,222 but no longer is seeking an opinion of counsel an alleged infringer's
only chance for a successful defense. For this reason, defendants "applauded
the [Seagate] ruling, which could substantially reduce findings of willfulness
and the attendant specter of up to treble damages and attorneys' fees. 223
2.

The Negative Consequences of the New Willful Patent Infringement Doctrine on Patentees

Although the effects of the In re Seagate decision seem to suggest that
the balance between the defendant and the patentee in willful infringement cases
has been re-established,2 24 this decision might have some negative effects on the
patent system. The In re Seagate decision may spur innovation by providing
companies with a sense of security suggesting that, as long as they act in good
faith, they can build and develop products without fear of treble damages.
However, this decision also makes it substantially harder to prove willful patent
infringement, which has the potential to hurt patent owners, since the cost of
patent litigation is so expensive and the odds of being awarded treble damages
are very low. 225 The In re Seagate decision has "raise[d] significant new chal219
See Robert H. Resis, In re Seagate Technology, LLC-Impact On (Potential)Accused Infringers, Their Attorneys, and Patentees, INTELL. PROP. TODAY (October 2007), http://www.ip
today.com/articles/2007-10-resis.asp.
220
See supra note 165.
221
Correy E. Stephenson, Courts step in on patent reform, LAWYERS USA, (September 10,
2007), available at http://www.allbusiness.com/legal/legal-services-law-practice-major-usfirms/891180-1-html.
222
See supranote 86.
223 See Clonts, supra note 27, at 9.
224
As one patent attorney who represented Seagate noted, "[t]his decision goes a long way
towards leveling the playing field in patent cases. It restores a client's right to receive effective
representation from trial counsel without a threat of interference from the patentee." See Mondaq
Press Release, McDermott Will & Emery, United States: McDermott Achieves Precedent-Setting
Victory In Patent Infringement Case, (August 23, 2007), http://www.mondaq.com
/content/prarticle.asp?prjid=2016.
225
Johnson Law Group, Patent Infringement Lawyer Johnson Law Group Says New Ruling on
Willful Infringement Will Help Innovation but Hurt Patent Owners, MARKET WIRE, (October
2007), http://findarticles.comlp/articles/mlipwwi/is-2007 10/ai_n21058826.
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lenges for patent holders who are seeking punitive damages for willful patent
infringement., 226 Some experts even suggest that the In re Seagate decision is a
"big blow to patent owners" 227 because they will no "longer be able to hold a
hammer of willful infringement over the heads of accused infringers to get favorable settlements. ,,228 Prior to In re Seagate, patent owners had placed the
alleged infringer in a "Quantum dilemma ' 229 and since "the adverse consequences of a willful infringement verdict were so severe ... accused infringers
were under great pressure to waive the privilege and introduce opinions of
counsel at trial., 230 Under this pre-In re Seagate "hammer," an alleged infringer
would most likely settle the claim instead of risking a treble damage award at
trial. However, the In re Seagate decision eliminated this "hammer" and, as a
result, most alleged infringers will go to trial to successfully defend against the
willful infringement claim. 23 ' Additionally, without this "hammer of willful
infringement," and the threat of treble damages, "companies may be more willing to market potentially infringing products and services," which means more
patents are likely to be infringed. 32 Although potential infringers still may be
held liable for willful infringement, the new standard of objective recklessness
makes defending against willful infringement claims easier.233
The In re Seagate decision stemmed from more and more courts giving
rights to the alleged infringer.234 Thus far, reform in the patent system has come
from the Patent and Trademark Office, 235 the Federal Circuit, and the U.S.
.236

227

See Seidenberg, supra note 198, at 20.
Id.

228

Id.

226

See supra note 63.
See Gerber et al., supra note 64.
231
See Ian Feinberg et. al., United States: The Federal Circuit Rewrites The Standard For
Willful Infringement And DrasticallyNarrows The Scope Of Privilege Waivers, Mondaq Business
Briefing, (August 30, 2007), available at http://www.mayerbrown .com/litigation/practice/article
.asp?pnid=2181 &id=3713&nid=2190. Out of all the lawsuits filed under the theory of infringement and willful infringement, only 6.2% went to trial and over 70% settled. See Moore, supra
note 200, at 233.
232
See Seidenberg, supra note 198.
233
See Clonts, supra note 27.
234
See Feinberg, supra note 231. This seems to be following the unbroken string of Supreme
Court and Federal Circuit en banc decisions that benefit accused infringers. See Microsoft v.
AT&T, 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007) (making it clear that foreign reproduction of U.S.-produced software does not infringe U.S. patents); KSR v. Teleflex, 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (making it easier
for accused infringers to prove obviousness); Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genetech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764
(2007) (making it easier for accused infringers to choose forum); DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co.,
471 F.3d 1293 (2006) (making it harder for patent owners to prove inducement of infringement).
235
For more information on the changes in the PTO see supra note 221.
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For more information on the changes in the Federal Circuit see Daniel Harris, IP Experts:
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Supreme Court,2 37 but has yet to come from the legislature. 238 Thus, the next
step in patent reform will most likely come from Congress. 239 "Congressional
interest in patent policy and possible patent reform has expanded as the importance of intellectual property [and] innovation has increased," 4 and on September 7, 2007, the House of Representatives passed the Patent Reform Act of
2007.24 l If this bill becomes law, it will "provide further hurdles to proving
willful infringement and will further reduce the need [for alleged infringers] to
obtain opinion letters. 242 Under this proposed Act, a potential infringer will
only be held to have willfully infringed on a patent in three situations. 4 3 The
first scenario where a potential infringer could be held to have willfully infringed would occur if the alleged infringer received notice from the patent
owner and, after a reasonable opportunity to investigate, failed to investigate his
actions and continued to unlawfully infringe. 2 4 The second way willful infringement could occur is when the alleged infringer "intentionally copied the
patented invention with knowledge that it was patented." 245 The last scenario
which a potential infringer could be held to have willfully infringed would occur
if the alleged infringer is found by a court to have infringed on a patent and this
infringer continues its unlawful activity. 24
Along with these limitations on when a patentee is allowed to claim
willful infringement, the alleged infringer also has three affirmative defenses
under this proposed Act.247 Under the Act, alleged infringers may demonstrate
that they had an "informed good faith belief that their conduct was not infringing or that the patent was invalid or unenforceable."2 48 Infringers may demonThat Congress Should Visit the Patent Reform Act, ELEC. DESIGN at 37 (2007),
http://electronicdesign.conArticles/lndex.cfm?ArticlelD=17459&bypass=1.
For more information on the changes in Supreme Court rulings see Harris, supra note 236.
237
The Supreme Court has added to patent reform in several cases in 2006 and 2007. See supra note
234; eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (court held that injunctions barring the infringer
from using a patent don't have to automatically follow a decision. Instead, courts will weigh four
traditional factors to determine if an injunction is justified); KSR v. Teleflex, 127 U.S. 1727
(2007) (court set a new precedent for technology patentability based on obviousness).
238 See Stephenson, supra note 221.
239 See Edward H. Rice, Avoiding Willful Infringement Exposure: Are Opinion Letters Still
Necessary?, METROPOLrrAN CORP. COUNSEL, at 44 (December 2007), available at http://www.
loeb.com/avoidingwillfulinfringementexposureareopinionlettersstiflnecessary/.
240 Patent Reform in the 110th Congress: Innovation Issues, 110th Cong. (2007).
See id.; see Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007).
241
242
See H.R. 1908.
243
See id. at 1908(5)(c)(2)(A)-(C).
See Rice, supra note 239, at 44; H.R. 1908(5)(c)(2)(A).
244
See Rice, supra note 239, at 44; H.R. 1908(5)(c)(2)(B).
245
246
See Rice, supra note 239, at 44; H.R. 1908(5)(c)(2)(A).
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See Rice, supra note 239, at 44.
See id.; H.R. 1908(5)(c)(3)(A).
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strate this good faith belief by presenting evidence that (1) they reasonably relied on advice of counsel,2 49 (2) they modified their conduct to avoid infringement after learning of the patent, 5 ° or (3) there is other evidence suggesting a
good faith use of the patent.2 5'
V.

CONCLUSION

The Seagate decision has been anticipated for years and will affect not
only the business decisions of corporations, but will also have a great impact on
patent infringement. This decision has put patent law in conformity with other
areas of law that allow for enhanced damages. Potential infringers rejoice in the
decision as it will dramatically reduce the number of findings of willful infringement and make defending against such claims much cheaper and easier.
However, with the higher standard for determining willfulness, the effect on
patentees has not been to their benefit. Patentees will now have a much harder
time asserting their patent rights, and with the high cost of litigation, will have
to weigh these costs against the possible awards.
No longer will patentees be able to place alleged infringers in a catch-22
and, as a result, patentees will not be able to force alleged infringers into settlement. For this reason, the courts should expect to see a decrease in the amount
of patent infringement claims. The Seagate decision is just the start of a new
era but has opened the door to many more reforms in patent law.
ChristopherRyan Lanks*

250

See H.R. 1908(5)(c)(3)(B)(i).
See H.R. 1908(5)(c)(3)(B)(ii).

251

See H.R. 1908(5)(c)(3)(B)(i); Rice, supra note 239.

249

I thank Ryan Simonton and Ben Warder for overall editorial support; Chelsea Brown, Jaci
Gonzales, and Todd Bergstrom for technical editorial support; and the West Virginia Law Review
for giving me this opportunity. Finally, I would like to thank my mother, Lynda Lanks, for all the
support she has given me throughout my law school career, and my father, Chip Lanks, for the
time he has spent reading drafts and discussing the issues presented here.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2009

33

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 111, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 11

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol111/iss2/11

34

